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Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) is a targeted threat to thousands of species globally, 
including fish, fungi, medicinal plants, charismatic mammals, and many others taxa. 
Despite widespread recognition of the problem, academic and policy debates are 
dominated by a few high-profile species (e.g., rhinoceros, tigers, elephants), and often 
overlook or conflate complex IWT products, actors, networks and contexts.  
Imprecision in our understanding of IWT is aggravated by a lack of vocabulary and 
frameworks to dissect complex phenomena in a structured way. We synthesize the 
available evidence on IWT across taxa and geographies into a typology-based 
framework that considers 1) the diversity of wildlife products; 2) IWT actor roles 
related to the harvesters, intermediaries and consumers; and 3) common IWT trade 
network configurations.  We propose how these tools can inform structured analyses 
of IWT, to inform more nuanced, appropriate, targeted and effective responses to 
illegal wildlife harvest, trade and use. 
 
 
Caricature of a biodiversity crisis  
Illegal wildlife trade targets thousands of species of terrestrial and marine animals, 
plants, and fungi worldwide (IUCN 2012), with cascading impacts on the 
environment, livelihoods, food security, national security and sustainable 
development (e.g., Oldfield 2003; Dickson et al. 2008; USA 2014; Brashares et al. 
2014; NOAA 2016).  While trade in many taxa is legal and regulated, escalating 
illegal trade is of increasing conservation concern globally.  IWT has attracted 
renewed societal, media and political attention, as well as hundreds of millions of 
dollars in additional investment, largely in response to dramatic increases in elephant 
and rhinoceros poaching (Duffy and Humphreys 2014; UW 2014; Sutherland et al. 
2014). 
 
There are growing scientific and policy debates over which types of conservation 
interventions are most effective, including increased enforcement, demand reduction 
strategies, provision of alternative livelihoods, market-based and incentive-oriented 
approaches (e.g., Biggs et al. 2013; Sutherland et al. 2014; Duffy 2014; Bennett 
2015). The diversity of proposed interventions reflects the complexity of IWT,  yet 
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practitioner and policy debates often approach IWT as simple and monolithic (cf. 
Österblom et al. 2011; Brashares et al. 2014).  For example, taxonomic biases mean 
that a few charismatic species are often treated as representative of broader IWT (e.g., 
elephants, rhinos, tigers, UW 2014; Sutherland et al. 2014), while the vast majority of 
traded species are overlooked (cf. Nijman et al. 2012).  Similarly, IWT discussions 
often classify diverse actor roles and motivations into simplistic categories of 
"poachers", "perpetrators" and "criminals" (Duffy 2014; e.g., UK 2014; USA 2014; 
Douglas and Alie 2014).  Diversity is further obscured by a growing focus on 
organized criminal syndicates in the trade of some taxa, which overlooks more 
pedestrian forms of wildlife trade and use (Duffy 2016; see Pires 2012; e.g., Bennett 
2011; Douglas and Alie 2014; USA 2014).  
 
Indeed, illegal systems are often difficult to study directly, and so it is unsurprising 
that many policies underappreciate patterns and nuances (cf. von Lampe 2012).  
However, lessons from the drug trade highlight the limitations of interventions based 
on popular misunderstandings about illegal trade dynamics.  Broad assumptions about 
how trade is organized and responds has led to policies that overlook the underlying 
causes of trade; fail to anticipate unintended consequences such as social impacts and 
undesirable price signals, and tend to overlook the resilience of trade networks to 
enforcement (see Williams 1998; Kenny 2007; LSE 2014). 
 
Imprecision in IWT study and debate is also aggravated by the lack of vocabulary and 
frameworks to dissect IWT phenomena (see South and Wyatt 2011). There is clear 
need for tools to navigate the diversity of products, actors, networks and contexts that 
comprise IWT in a way that is structured and comprehensible (cf. Ostrom 2009; Laird 
et al. 2010; von Lampe 2012).  Shared lexicon would allow for more nuanced and 
productive dialogue, and improve formulation of research and conservation 
interventions. 
 
We review IWT across taxa, contexts and geographies, drawing from the IWT 
literature and field experience in order to (1) define IWT products; (2) present a 
typology to characterize key IWT actor roles; (3) understand common IWT network 
configurations, and (4) illustrate how these typologies can facilitate structured 
analysis of IWT interventions. 
 
Defining IWT products 
IWT involves the harvest, trade and use of wild, biological specimens for uses 
ranging from food to ornaments to construction (Table 1).  It affects a wide range of 
flora, fauna and fungi, and both live specimens and various wildlife products needed 
or valued by consumers. Notwithstanding that some forms of wildlife trade are legal, 
IWT is characterized by actions that contravene stated environmental regulations, 
including government legislation, rules governing private/community resource-holder 
rights, and/or international agreements (e.g., Convention on the International Trade of 
Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna, CITES).  Equally, however, many instances 
of harvest and trade are unsustainable from an ecological perspective, but are not 
necessarily illegal. 
 
Despite a tendency to associate IWT with a narrow range of taxa, trade affects 
thousands of species, including timber, marine species (i.e., Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing), small mammals, insects, plants and reptiles (IUCN 2015; cf. 
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Laird et al. 2010; Nijman et al. 2012).  Importantly, single species often provide 
multiple products that may enter completely different value chains (e.g., medicinal 
versus ornamental orchids).  In addition, different forms or sources of a single product 
may be legal, while others are illegal (e.g., farmed versus wild-collected specimens; 
organisms collected within or outside of official quotas; individuals traded 
domestically versus internationally). 
 
Characterizing IWT actors 
IWT involves a range of actors in harvest, trade and use dimensions. Actors differ not 
only in roles they play along market chains, but in their personal attributes, 
preferences and motivations; different scales of operation and intensities of harvest; 
levels of technological investment; sources of funding, levels of economic reliance, 
and knowledge, including of associated regulations (see Muth and Bowe 1998; 
Eliason 1999; Wyatt 2009; South and Wyatt 2011; Duffy et al. 2015).  
 
Our typology distinguishes roles played by harvesters, intermediaries and consumers 
that, while not mutually-exclusive, categorize key patterns across IWT situations 
(Table 1; Fig. 1).  Actors can participate in multiple roles, with a wide range of 
motivations that are both context and value-dependent, and change over time (see 
South and Wyatt 2011; Duffy et al. 2015).  For example, some actors are highly 
specialized and focus on target specific taxa, while many are more generic (e.g., wild 
meat, fish).  While illegal wildlife harvest and consumption are often characterized as 
the result of economic poverty or greed, motivations are often far more complex (see 
Duffy et al. 2015); even among comparatively poor communities, wildlife 
consumption can be associated with preferences, stature, and higher incomes (e.g., 
Mbete et al. 2011). Similarly, harvesters may be poor in absolute terms, but well off 
in comparison to their neighbors, where IWT represents better economic prospects 
than alternative opportunities (e.g., Vira et al. 2014).   
 
 Wildlife harvesters 
We distinguish among eight broad categories of harvester roles (Table 1; Fig. 1). 
Subsistence harvesters are primarily engaged in collection of wild resources for 
household or non-commercial local uses (e.g., Golden et al. 2013). However, 
subsistence activities often overlap with more specialized commercial harvest. For 
example, in Central Vietnam's Thua Thien Hue Province, forest-accessing 
communities often use snares in subsistence harvest, although some residents also use 
targeted, specialized cages to trap stump-tailed macaques (Macaca arctoides) to 
supply luxury urban markets.  Similar combinations of subsistence and commercial 
harvest exist among the Waorani communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon (see 
Example 3, below). 
 
Both subsistence and commercial markets can also involve opportunistic harvest.  In 
Central Vietnam some residents also opportunistically fell fruiting trees of Scaphium 
lychnophorum to harvest fruits for international markets (ELW, pers. obs.). While 
commercially-motivated, this is neither a regular nor primary livelihood, which are 





Table 1. Typology of key actor roles along IWT market chains.  Categories are not 
mutually exclusive. 
Harvesters 
Subsistence Non-commercial harvest for household or local use (e.g., food, cultural, see list below), 
usually comparatively small-scale 
Specialist 
commercial 
Harvest with an explicit commercial orientation that often involves specialist skills or 
technologies. Includes different harvest intensities, levels of technological investment, 
and is led by both self-employed and hired harvesters, and by local residents and 
outsiders 
Opportunist Harvest based on chance encounters and circumstances, but not as a primary objective 
or livelihood strategy 
Local guide Local residents hired to guide outside harvesters  
Rule abuser Knowing abuse of harvest rules, such as quotas (e.g., under or mis-reporting), 
boundaries (e.g., protected area) or restrictions on technology (e.g., certain traps, nets) 
Bycatch Unintentional harvest of non-target species 
Recreational Harvest for enjoyment 
Reactionary Harvest associated with discontent or protest (e.g., in reaction to conservation policies 
or conflict with wildlife) 
Intermediaries 
Logistician Involved in ordering, aggregation and transport, as well as financing and planning 
trade. May be directly involved in handling trade or involved at a distance. 
Specialized 
smuggler 
Transport that requires specialized actions to evade detection or negotiate access (e.g., 
transboundary smuggling, specialist networks) 
Government 
colluder  
Involved in using an official government position (park ranger, police officer, judge, 
prosecutor) to facilitate trade, whether for financial (corruption), social or personal 
gain 
3rd party  External services hired to support trade, but potentially unknowingly (e.g., bus or air 
transport)  
Processor Involved in product transformation (e.g., skinning, medicine preparation) 
Launderer Involved in laundering illegal wildlife into legal markets chains (e.g., via captive 
breeding or processing operations) 
Vendor Involved in direct sale to consumers or to other intermediaries (e.g., market, online 
platform) 
Consumers 
Medicinal Use associated with medicinal practices, usually traditional but some novel 
Ornamental  Use associated with ornaments and pets (e.g., ivory, shell, live parrots, aquarium fish)  
Cultural Use associated with long-standing traditional practices (e.g., feathers, pelts, ritual 
harvest) 
Gift Use as a gift, often to gain/demonstrate social standing or show respect 
Investment Use as an investment, usually of high-value taxa  
Recreational Use associated with the act of recreational harvest (e.g., game hunting, sport fishing)   
Animal food Use as food for other animals (e.g., fodder, bait, small animals) 
Construction 
materials 
Use for construction materials (e.g., timber, rattan) 
Fuel Use for burning for heat or cooking 
Food  Use for direct consumption, ranging from luxury consumption to basic nutritional need 
 
  
However, specialized commercial harvest often requires sophisticated technologies, 
networks, funding and coordination.  At the extreme, harvest of high-value taxa (e.g., 
tigers, rhinos, shark fins, birds of prey, hardwood timber) often involves external 
professional harvesters, criminal syndicates and connections to political elite.  These 
may hire local residents to harvest or guide outside harvesters (local guide, e.g., 
Wyatt 2009; GW 2007; Bennett 2011). Recent African ivory seizures highlight the 
ability of these commercial harvesters to adapt to increasing enforcement (Milliken 
2014; Vira et al. 2014). 
 
Illegal harvest can also occur when harvesters break the rules associated with legal 
harvest systems (rule abuser).  For example, the abuse of allocated harvest quotas in 
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the fishing and timber sectors, the use of illegal technologies such as snares or 
dynamite fishing, and harvest within protected area boundaries can convert otherwise 
legal harvest into illegal goods (e.g., Hatcher and Gordon 2005; Radjawali 2011).  
Similarly, accidental bycatch of protected species, such as due to harvest using snares 
or nets, can represent illegal takes. 
 
Illegal harvest can also be associated with recreational activities, or can represent a 
defensive response to conflict with wildlife, such as crop raiding that affects rural 
livelihoods, or opposition to conservation policies (reactionary harvester, Muth and 
Bowe 1998; Oldfield 2003).    
 
 
Figure 1. Diverse types of IWT harvesters.  (a) Subsistence harvester with porcini 
mushroom (Boletus edulis) collected without permits in Forli Province, Italy 
(Credit: D.Galli). (b) African elephant (Loxodonta africana), widely targeted for 
ivory across its range by specialist commercial harvesters, often with support of 
local guides (Credit: P.Mannix). (c) Inspection of a fishing vessel in the Gulf of 
Guinea suspected of abusing fishing rules (Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 




Trade intermediaries  
Moving wildlife to consumers typically relies on actors generically described as 
"middlemen", although these intermediaries in illegal networks can serve diverse and 
complex roles (cf. UNODC 2002). They often work as logisticians involved in 
moving goods in ways that require specific contacts, networks and skills (Warchol 
2004; Wyatt 2009). They may be directly involved in ordering and handling illegal 
goods, or may be more distantly associated through financial links or coordinating 
logistics for others (e.g., Milliken and Shaw 2012; Milliken 2014). Because accessing 
markets for illegal products can be challenging and high-risk, intermediaries are often 
critical to facilitating access across international borders (specialized smuggler), 
including by bribing or working with government agents (government colluders, e.g., 
Fig. 2, 4a; Pires 2012; Vira et al. 2014).  However, in some instances, intermediaries 
may be 3rd parties that are unaware of their roles, as in the case of airlines or bus 
companies (TRAPS 2015).  
 
Intermediaries may also engage in physical transformation of wildlife, such as 
cleaning, butchering, skinning, or preparing medicines (processors, e.g., Vira et al. 
2014).  This may require specialized skills or infrastructure, such as sawmills for 
timber. Intermediaries may also provide laundering services that integrate illegal 
products into mainstream legal value chains (launderers), as has been documented 
among farms that claim to raise porcupines for meat (Brooks et al. 2010), reptiles and 
birds for pets (Fig. 4) and timber for furniture (GP 2014).  Most visibly, 
intermediaries also include consumer-facing vendors and their associated platforms 
(e.g., public markets, online platforms). 
 
 Wildlife consumers 
Consumer uses of wildlife are as diverse as the of taxa illegally traded (Table 1).  
Public attention is often on medicinal use, particularly of charismatic taxa for 
Traditional Asian Medicine.  However, thousands of other species are also used as 
medicines globally (Laird et al. 2010; Nijman et al. 2012), and many taxa have other, 
complex social meanings and diverse uses (see Courchamp et al. 2006; Truong et al. 
2015). Wildlife and their parts can have ornamental uses, including as pets (e.g., 
Wyatt 2009; Pires 2012), can serve as cultural objects (e.g., De Angelis 2012), and/or 
be used as high-value gifts or investments (e.g., Gao and Clark 2014; Truong et al. 
2015).  Wildlife may also be used in activities where harvest itself is a recreational or 
cultural act (e.g., Muth and Bowe 1998).  Some wildlife are also used as animal food 
to feed captive/domesticated animals (Naylor et al. 2000), for construction materials, 
and as fuel (e.g., charcoal, Wyatt 2013).  Importantly, many taxa are used for food, 
both to meet basic nutritional requirements and as luxury products due to a range of 
consumer preferences (e.g., Example 3, below). 
 
Consumers may be present anywhere along the market chain, including at or near the 
point of harvest, in association with transport, or at defined end-markets, restaurants 
or online portals.  Illegal transactions may occur in open markets or in secret, 
including through secret transactions, through the anonymity of online sales, or 
through the laundering of wild products (e.g., Fig. 4).  Importantly, downstream 
consumers are not necessarily aware of the origins of wild products (e.g., Fig. 2, 4) or 




Understanding IWT networks 
Actors in IWT are configured into diverse network configurations (cf. UNODC 2002; 
Kenney 2007), of which we identify seven common structures (Table 2).  Their 
architecture ranges from simple relationships, such as subsistence and local use 
relationship, or a structure that links harvesters directly to consumers (Table. 2a,b), 
to configurations that involve multiple intermediaries.  Much of this complexity arises 
from restrictions to access, whether to the resource itself, transport routes or to 
consumers—including to distant urban or international markets willing to pay higher 
prices.  
 
Table 2. Typology of common IWT network configurations, linking wildlife 
harvesters (black circles), intermediaries (white circles) and consumers (triangles).  
These can refer to both the structure of entire networks, or to the "building blocks" 
of more complex, compound networks. 
 
A network configuration restricted by resource access is defined by trade structured 
around a specific geography and/or limited set of harvesters (Table 2c).  For example, 
the Lao Newt (Laotriton laoensis) is endemic to high elevation streams in a small part 
northern Laos. As a result, international collectors have relied on local residents with 
species knowledge and access to harvest newts for the pet trade (Phimmachak et al. 
2012). 
 
Gatekeeper configurations arises when a limited number of intermediaries control 
market access, based on the provision of pivotal services, contacts or capital that 
enable them to overcome transport, enforcement or technical barriers (Table 2d).  For 
example, the illegal timber trade in Pará, Brazil relies on central mills that provide 
timber processing and avenues through which to launder illegal timber into legal 
supply chains (GP 2014).  Similarly, the Indonesian reptile trade requires specialized 
knowledge, contacts and access to permits to enable international trade (Fig. 4).  The 
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live reef fish trade uses expensive technologies to keep fish healthy and attractive 
until they reach overseas restaurants (Radjawali 2011).  Such centralized structures 
are also likely where criminal syndicates exclude other participants through force 
(Bennett 2011; Milliken 2014).   
 
Trade networks can also be restricted by market access that mediate consumer access 
(Table. 2e), such as specific stores, neighborhoods, markets or online portals to which 
trade is restricted, forcing or enabling certain patterns of trade interactions. 
Restrictions may require several linked intermediaries (Table 2f) to enable transport, 
evade enforcement, pay bribes, and/or leverage social networks to enable trade across 
protected area boundaries, police checkpoints and international borders (multiple 
barriers to market, e.g., Radjawali 2011; Vira et al. 2014; Phelps 2015). Structures 
with redundant pathways are characterized by complex web-shaped configurations, 
are the result of few barriers to participation in harvest and/or access to market (Table 
2g).  These networks involve widespread participation and exchanges among a larger 
number of individuals and are more likely where enforcement is weak. 
 
Trade frequently involves compounded networks that integrate multiple 
configurations (Table 2).  For example, Southeast Asia's trade in wild, ornamental 
orchids affects hundreds of species and involves surprisingly complex trade networks 




Figure 2. Network of illegal trade in protected ornamental orchids harvested in 
Southeast Asia.  (a) Overview of trade network of plants from Lao PRD and 
Myanmar for sale in Thailand and internationally, including the roles of harvesters, 
intermediaries and consumers (Phelps and Webb 2015; Phelps 2015).  Colored 
lines illustrate selected examples of trade network structures (see Table 2). (b) 
Ornamental orchid (Eria ornata) commonly harvested in Myanmar. (c) 
Ornamental orchid (Dendrobium lamyaiae), a narrowly-distributed (possibly 
endemic) species harvested in Lao PDR.	
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Beyond actor and network mapping, understanding IWT requires evaluation of the 
contexts that shape actors' decisions--determining actual and perceived rewards, 
effort, preferences and risks associated with illegal behavior (Ostrom 2011; e.g., 
WebPanel 1). These include biological characteristics, such as species abundance, 
distribution and fecundity, and physical variables such as topography, seasonality and 
infrastructure.  The factors affect access to wildlife, as well as effort and profitability 
from IWT.  Decisions are further shaped by governance context, such as the legal-
regulatory framework and the effectiveness of enforcement, which shape the secrecy 
and effort involved in harvest, processing and transport; the sanctions of getting 
caught, and perceived legitimacy of rules (e.g., Moreto and Lemieux 2014; South and 
Wyatt 2011).  Decisions are also defined by social context, including individual 
agency (Duffy et al. 2015), relationships to specific wildlife products (e.g., Gao and 
Clark 2014), knowledge about where to find wildlife, and levels of trust, fidelity, 
transparency and benefit sharing among actors (e.g., Radjawali 2011; cf. McGloin and 
Kirk 2010).  
 
IWT actors and networks are dynamic; they adjust to changes in biophysical 
parameters (seasonality, weather, abundance), market pressures (price increases) and 
governance contexts.  For example, some consumers' preferences for rarity can 
simultaneously increase harvest pressure and increase rarity (Courchamp et al. 2006).  
Changes in enforcement actions can yield novel interactions (cf. Williams 1998).  For 
example, increased enforcement seems to have led to new configurations in Russia's 
falcon trade (Wyatt 2009), and to a shift to online sales in China's ivory trade (Gao 
and Clark 2014).  
 
 
Implications for conservation and illustrative examples 
Trade dynamics are the function of interactions among products, actors, and 
networks, themselves embedded in a range of biological, physical, governance and 
social contexts (Fig. 3). These factors not only interact but also shape how different 
conservation interventions play out, including likelihood of success and unintended 
outcomes.  
 
Faced with this complexity, a typological approach has potential to help us 
consolidate languages and concepts across taxa and contexts. It is particularly useful 
in the context of limited ecological data, conservation resources, uncertainty and 
contention over the most appropriate interventions, in order to facilitate policy 
debates, inform research and craft more nuanced, socially appropriate, fair and 
effective interventions.  The following taxa examples highlight parts of a typology-
based framework (see also WebPanel 2), and how it can be used to inform 






Figure 3. Framework for evaluating IWT interventions to consider contextual parameters, products, actors (Table 1), networks (Table 2), and 
their relationships to conservation interventions. (The framework is expanded in WebTable1.) 
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Example 1: Defining products - Southeast Asian orchid products 
Commercial trade is an intense, targeted threat to many Southeast Asian orchid 
species (Fig. 2) 3; Phelps 2015; Phelps and Webb 2015).  Conservation efforts have 
traditionally focused on restricting international trade, although these rules are widely 
disregarded (Phelps and Webb 2015).  Structured IWT analysis (Fig. 3) highlights 
opportunities for strengthened interventions, including based on an improved 
understanding of orchid products themselves. 
 
Although superficially similar, orchid trade shows non-trivial differences (in 
consumer preferences, prices and networks) between relatively common ornamental 
species, and the trade of rare and endemic species targeted by specialist consumers 
(Phelps 2015; cf. Hinsley et al. 2015).  Moreover, the trade in ornamental orchids 
exists alongside a trade in medicinal species; even though both involve similar 
geographies and even some of the same species (e.g., Dendrobium nobile), they 
generally involve separate actors and networks (Phelps 2015).  These trades are also 
largely decoupled from trade in other wildlife (Phelps 2015).   
 
Conservation interventions must thus define which subset of orchid products they 
target. For example, while conservation actions have primarily focused on overseas 
markets, much trade is regional (Phelps and Webb 2015).  And, although considerable 
trade occurs at public markets, these are primarily for ornamental species (Phelps 
2015); interventions focused on these markets would largely overlook the medicinal 
trade.  Differences among products also shape consumer-facing interventions, and 
must distinguish between informal gardeners who unintentionally buy wild plants, 
and specialists who may be aware of, but unconcerned by the conservation 
implications of their purchases.  Although one audience could be targeted with 
awareness-raising and improved access to sustainable greenhouse-grown plants, 
specialists might not respond and should perhaps instead be targeted with 
enforcement. 
 
Example 2: Characterizing actors - South African rhinoceros horn 
harvesters 
South Africa, home to over 80% of the world’s remaining white rhino (Ceratotherium 
simum), saw a ten-fold increase in poaching between 2007-2014, principally to supply 
East Asian medicinal trade (Milliken and Shaw 2012) .  Conservation efforts focus on 
strengthening the enforcement of trade bans, with anti-poaching efforts at the point of 
harvest, and enhanced enforcement efforts along the supply chain (Biggs et al. 2013; 
Milliken 2014).  Analysis of the actors involved, however, reveals a diversity of 
harvester types and contexts that may be central to designing more nuanced and 
effective interventions. 
 
Significant illegal harvest occurs within Kruger National Park by residents of 
neighboring, generally poor communities, and working for, or with, organized 
criminal syndicates (e.g., Milliken 2014).  However, illegal harvest also occurs on 
private land: private landholders can collect horns from rhinos that die naturally or are 
de-horned to minimize poaching risk (Biggs et al. 2013).  Horns are stored in guarded 
vaults, but have recently been subject to theft by organized criminal groups. Faced 
with this dilemma, some farmers have reportedly colluded to have horns stolen from 
their property for financial gain, (e.g., SR 2012).   
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These distinct roles and contexts may merit different interventions.  For example, 
South African landowners can legally own and harvest wildlife on their property.  
Legalizing international trade of sustainable, non-lethally harvested horn could create 
incentives for these actors to engage in conservation and sustainable use (Biggs et al. 
2013).  However, interventions necessarily differ in contexts where wildlife is owned 
by the state and hunting is illegal, such as in national parks or in Kenya.  These 
contexts may require enforcement alongside alternatives, such as poverty reduction 
and/or payments to local communities for reduced poaching. However, these 
responses also require nuance, such as to distinguish among actors responding to local 
poverty and those involved in outside criminal enterprises (Roe et al 2015). 
 
 Example 3: Characterizing actors - Amazonian wild meat consumers 
Ecuador's Yasuní Biosphere Park and Reserve is a biodiversity hotspot and home to 
Waorani indigenous communities, subject to IWT for wild meat.  Commercial trade 
tripled between 2005-2007, dominated by paca (Cuniculus paca), collared peccary 
(Pecari tajacu), white-lipped peccary (Tayassu pecari) and wolly monkeys 
(Lagothrix poeppiggi) (Suarez et al. 2009).  While interventions have traditionally 
focused on opportunistic enforcement against harvest and transport, analysis 
highlights the importance of characterizing IWT actors, specifically distinguishing 
among different consumers. 
 
Local communities have ancestral rights to legally hunt for subsistence consumption 
(Suarez et al. 2009). This, however, is distinct from the illegal trade to satisfy demand 
among shift-workers visiting the region (e.g., petroleum industry), rural-to-urban 
migrants seeking wild meat, and domestic tourists interested in traditional cuisine 
(Suarez et al. 2009; Poats et al. 2011).  This trade expanded in the mid-1990's with 
increased road access and demand, tripling between 2005-2007 (Suarez et al. 2009). 
 
A collaboration among TRAFFIC, the Ministry of Environment and local 
communities has tailored interventions to each consumer group (A.Puyol, B.Ortiz, 
S.V. Poats pers. comms.; Poats 2011).  Legal subsistence harvest continues, but has 
been negotiated with local residents (via incentives, negotiation, enforcement) to 
promote selective-harvest, a hunting ban in core areas, and reduce commercial IWT. 
In contrast, low and middle-income urban consumers were targeted with educational 
messaging to reduce consumption, presented by a popular mayor via the regional bus 
network.  Distinct messaging targeted shift-workers, via the principle regional airline 
used by industry. The restaurants they frequented were engaged to display signs that 
they no longer serve wild meat, and were offered cooking training to incentivize their 
participation.  Domestic tourists were targeted through higher-end restaurants and 
with national television spots. 
 
 Example 4: Understanding networks - Indonesian pet reptiles 
Indonesia is a leading source in the global trade of pet reptiles, most of which are 
wild-caught (Fig. 4; Nijman and Shepherd 2009; Lyons and Natusch 2011; Natusch 
and Lyons 2012).  Interventions have traditionally relied on harvest quotas and 
international trade, although these are poorly designed and/or overlooked (Lyons and 
Natusch 2011).  Trade analysis specifically highlights opportunities for strategic 






Figure 4. Overview of the illegal trade of wild, protected Indonesian reptiles for the North American exotic pet market. (a) Overview of the 
illegal trade network and key actor roles (C.Shepherd and S.Stoner pers.comms.; Natusch and Lyons 2012). (b) Emerald tree monitor (Varanus 
prasinus), a species traded as a pet and restricted to New Guinea and adjacent islands (Credit: T.Vickers). (c) Green tree python (Morellia 
virdis), an IUCN Vulnerable species threatened by trade (Credit: S.Niedlich). 
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The United States is a leading market for wild-collected Indonesian pet reptiles.  This 
trade relies on a small group of gatekeepers (Table 2d), including intermediary 
logisticians that coordinate harvest across the archipelago, launderers that integrate 
wild-caught individuals into legal breeding facilities (Lyons and Natusch 2011; 
Natusch and Lyons 2012), and a small number of US intermediaries (see Table 1).  
While conservation interventions against the harvesters across hundreds of Indonesian 
islands would be very challenging and socially detrimental, interventions targeting the 
US and Indonesian gatekeepers would be relatively efficient and feasible.  Their 
behavior could be shaped through international monitoring and enforcement, and/or 
new legislation requiring that U.S. importers to obtain proof of parentage to 




These typologies and the structured analyses they enable can help guide not only 
conservation actions but also research enquiry.  For example, clarification of diverse 
actor roles that moves beyond caricatures of wildlife poachers will facilitate closer 
examinations of relative economic benefits from trade, as well as the deeper 
motivations different actors have for participating in IWT (cf. Duffy et al. 2015), so 
that these can inform more appropriate, fair and effective conservation actions  
Similarly, recognition of different types of products and consumers can guide more 
detailed research on motivations and uses (e.g., Hinsley et al. 2015; Truong et al. 
2015).   
 
These typologies can also steer theorizing and testing which types of interventions are 
most appropriate under different conditions, such as for geographically-restricted 
versus widely distributed species; species for which consumers are price elastic versus 
inelastic; and IWT involving local residents versus 'outside' harvesters.  Efforts to 
identify rules of the game are reliant on first identifying terms, and ways to articulate 
and distinguish amongst actors and phenomena. 
 
The complexity of IWT precludes simple or standardized solutions. Systematic 
evaluations of IWT products, actors, networks and contexts can play a useful role in 
guiding future interventions and research. Deeper analyses, informed by these 
typologies, can inform more strategic, targeted and appropriate interventions for 
reducing IWT.    
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Web Only Material 
 





Key variables / 
questions 








• Defines product supply, including limits 
of sustainable harvest and, conversely, 
taxa vulnerability. 
• Defines temporally and spatially-explicit 
accessibility of products 
• Defines product rarity, price and shapes 
actor motivations 
• Defines when sustainable harvest 
is compatible with conservation  







• Defines accessibility, availability and 
convenience of harvest 
• Defines expertise required for harvest 
• Directs interventions towards sites 
and periods of greatest 
accessibility 
• Shapes interventions that seek to 




• Social networks 
• Cultural norms 
• Defines secrecy of the trade and trust 
within trade networks 
• Shapes access to certain sites, 
technologies and networks 
• Shapes ability to evade enforcement  
• Defines the perceived legitimacy of rules 
on IWT 
• Identifies actors that may wield 
authority or control 




• Regulations (local, 
national, international) 
• Cultural norms and 
rules 
• Enforcement  
• Defines probabilities of detection and 
prosecution that shape cost-benefit 
analyses 
• Defines nature and level of sanctions 
• Defines the perceived legitimacy of rules 
• Informs strategies to shift cost-
benefits of participating in IWT, 
such as through increased 
penalties 






Key variables / 
questions 
Description / Examples Types of implications for ITW Types of implications for 
conservation interventions 
• Corruption on IWT existing rules  
Define products What is the 
product?  
• Is it the entire 
organism harvested, or 
only part (e.g., 
leaves)? 
• Are there sub-products 
associated with one 
species? 
• Defines sustainability of trade 
• Defines where products originate 
• Defines where/how they travel 
• Defines how products are used  
• Focuses efforts on the specific 
product in trade, which could 
require more nuanced/specialized 
intervention strategies 
• Reduces chance of "gaps" in 
interventions 
 How is the 
product 
harvested? 
• Is the organism killed 
for harvest? 
• Does it require 
specific knowledge 
technology, or rights? 
• Defines sustainability of trade 
• Defines barriers to participating in trade   
• Shapes the need for intermediary roles 
• Directs interventions that modify 
harvesting techniques to make 
them more sustainable (e.g., non-
legal harvest). 
•  Directs interventions to actor that 
play key roles in IWT (e.g., 
processor) 




• Is there any legal 
trade? 
• What rules make the 
trade illegal? 
• Defines the rules of trade across the 
network and market chain 
• Defines the legitimacy of IWT rules 
• Pinpoints cases of laundering of 




What are the 
key actor roles? 




involved (Table 1)? 
• Defines the length and complexity of the 
market chain, and the barriers to 
participation in IWT 
• Defines the types of formal institutions 
involved in trade (e.g., captive breeding 
facilities, transportation companies) 
• Targets interventions at specific 
roles in the trade 
• Defines which official agencies 
and institutions may/may not be 






Key variables / 
questions 
Description / Examples Types of implications for ITW Types of implications for 
conservation interventions 
• Defines the involvement of official bodies 
(e.g., through corruption) 
 Who are the 
actors? 
• Are there key 
individuals involved in 
trade? 
• What are the socio-
economic profiles of 
actors? 
• Defines the level of organization and 
structure of the broader network 
• Defines how many people are involved 
• Defines the livelihood reliance on IWT 
• Targets interventions at key 
individuals 
• Considers the livelihood 
implications of different 
interventions on the actors 
• Defines the accessibility of 
interventions 
• Shapes security concerns 
associated with interventions 
 What are the 
motivations for 
IWT? 
• What are the 
economics of IWT for 
trade participants and 
consumer? 
• Are there non-
economic motivations 
for participating in 
trade? 
• Shapes actor behaviors, including 
preferences, price elasticity, risk 
perception and willingness to change 
• Defines the types of actors involved, 
including participation of organized 
criminal group 
• Directs interventions to consider 
broader incentive/disincentive 
structures and consider 
effectiveness of interventions such 
as alternative livelihoods, changed 
sanctions, etc. 
• Identifies strategies to address the 
non-economic motivations for 











present (Table 2)? 
• What types of social 
• Defines/defined by social relations among 
IWT actors  
• Defines profit margins and benefit sharing 
along market chains 
• Defines actors' flexibility to participate in 
trade and to change their behaviors 
• Defines strategies to cause the 
most disruption in a network 
• Defines accessibility for 
interventions 
• Defines how/whether networks are 







Key variables / 
questions 
Description / Examples Types of implications for ITW Types of implications for 
conservation interventions 
relations are reflected 
in networks? 
 Where are 
networks 
located? 
• What physical sites are 
linked by trade 
• Is trade physical or 
virtual? 
• If online, what types 
of platforms are used 
(e.g., social media, 
formal channels, dark 
web)? 
• Shapes relations among IWT actors, 
including trust, secrecy, concern 
• Defines the types of technology and 
access required to participate in trade 
• Defines technological demand and 
knowledge required for 
interventions to access  networks 
• Potentially involves 3rd parties in 
restricting trade (e.g., market 
managers, designers of online 
platforms) 
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WebPanel 1. Contextualizing trade: Olive ridley sea turtle eggs 
 
Although the most abundant sea turtle, the olive ridley (Lepidochelys olivacea) 
was listed as vulnerable in 2008 by the IUCN and is listed on CITES Appendix I; 
IWT of its eggs is a leading threat (Abreu-Grobois and Plotkin 2008). 
 
Trade analysis highlights harvest as a function of diverse contextual variables 
(biological, physical, social/relational and governance) that have to be considered 
in intervention design (Fig. 3).  Notably, most olive ridley individuals lay eggs 
according to individual-specific cues and sites, resulting in low egg availability 
throughout the year.  However, several subpopulations synchronize laying among 
tens of thousands of individuals, including at Costa Rica’s Ostional Beach.  This 
phenomenon is restricted to ~8km of beach over 4 months, which spatially and 
temporally shapes egg harvest regimes (Madrigal-Ballestero et al. 2013). 
 
Interventions must thus be tailored to these distinct contexts.  Indeed, while trade 
is illegal in most countries and contexts, Ostional uniquely hosts a legal, regulated 
harvest, restricted to local communities over a limited season.  As such, harvest 
(both legal and illegal) is shaped by governance characteristics, such as 
association management and rule enforcement.  Harvest is also shaped by actor 
characteristics, such as community membership, actors' economic dependence on 
trade, livelihood alternatives, and the perceived legitimacy of the existing 
restrictions (see Madrigal-Ballestero et al. 2013).  
 
Notably, many of these contextual and situational variables are spatially and 
temporally explicit (e.g., egg abundance, enforcement intensity), leading to 
distinct situations across space--even for the same species within neighboring 
communities (Hart et al. 2013).   
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WebPanel 2. Characterizing actors: Mushroom harvesters in the United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom hosts roughly 12,000 species of mushroom, several dozen of 
which are commonly harvested for consumption (Schulp et al. 2014; FC 2016; FH 
2016).  Common Law allows legal harvest for personal consumption (defined as 
1.5kg per visit), including on others' private land, and with the exception of protected 
areas (FC 2016).   This is contrasted with commercial harvest, which is banned, 
except with permission of a private land holder (Wildlife and Countryside Act of 
1981).  However, changes in the actors involved in harvest are increasing pressures on 
wild mushrooms, and may necessitate changed management. 
 
Recent growth in illegal large-scale, commercial harvest of wild mushrooms, to 
supply restaurants and markets, linked to growing demand for "wild food", is raising 
conservation concerns (see Carrington 2014). While the mushroom fruiting can be 
harvested without removing the whole organism, there is nevertheless concern over 
over-harvest and its impacts on other organisms (e.g., invertebrates).  This has led to 
small increase in prosecutions of illegal harvesters. (Carrington 2014). 
 
Importantly, there is also concern over a growth collection by subsistence harvesters, 
especially in high-traffic forests near urban areas and at popular destinations 
(Carrington 2014).  While legal, this practice may be outstripping supply in some 
areas, and may require changed management that recognizes not only different 
product uses (commercial versus subsistence), but also different types of subsistence 
harvesters and the contextual spatial and temporal dimensions of harvest.  This 
approach might shift the parameters of what and where harvest is considered (il)legal.  
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WebPanel 3. Example of the full use of typology-based framework (see Figure 3): 
Illegal trade in Southeast Asian ornamental orchids 
 
In the main text, we draw on the example of Southeast Asian orchid IWT to 
demonstrate the importance of "defining products" in designing conservation 
interventions.  Here we present a full overview of an analysis of the trade in 
ornamental orchids, which considers the importance of products, actors and networks 
to shaping conservation interventions. 
 
Southeast Asia's commercial trade in wild orchids involves hundreds of species and 
several distinct product categories (Phelps 2015; Phelps and Webb 2015).  There are, 
for example, differences between the trade of relatively common ornamental species, 
and that of rare, expensive species targeted by specialist growers (Phelps 2015; cf 
Hinsley et al. 2015).  Ornamental trade also exists alongside trade in medicinal orchid 
species; even though both involve similar geographies and species (e.g., Dendrobium 
nobile) they generally involve separate actors or networks (Phelps 2015).  Ornamental 
trade is also largely decoupled from the trade in greenhouse-grown plants (Phelps et 
al. 2013) and the trade in most other illegal wildlife (Phelps 2015).  
   
While ornamental trade can involve direct transactions between harvesters and 
consumers (Table 2b), trade often involves surprisingly diverse actor roles and 
complex networks (Fig. 2b vs. 2c). Products undergo limited physical transformation, 
but can involve numerous intermediaries across broad geographies (Fig. 2).  Their 
networks vary in structure, from redundant configurations (Table 2g) to reliance on 
gatekeepers (Table 2d; Fig. 3). Amidst this complexity, however, open public markets 
play a disproportionate role (Fig. 2; Table 2f), where trade (species richness, volume) 
is often dominated by a small number of vendors (Phelps 2013). 
 
To date, conservation interventions are limited, relying on international trade quotas 
and restrictions. Existing rules, however, are widely disregarded across the region 
(Phelps and Webb 2015).  Elsewhere, isolated interventions have established private 
and community-based orchid greenhouses, to promote legal sustainable production as 
an alternative to wild harvest, but have not clearly benefited conservation, and are 
often geographically distant from the sites of IWT (Phelps et al. 2013). 
 
There is clear scope for strengthened interventions based on improved understanding 
of IWT dynamics.  However, interventions must distinguish among apparently 
similar, but distinct orchid products. For example, consumer-facing interventions 
must distinguish between informal gardeners who unintentionally buy wild plants, 
most likely targeted through awareness raising campaigns and access to greenhouse-
grown plants, and interventions targeting specialized collectors that knowingly seek 
rare species. 
 
Intermediary-facing interventions are also likely to differ.  Unknowing 3rd party 
intermediaries (Table 1) can be targeted through awareness raising and conservation 
pledges, and potentially with fines for transporting illegal goods. In contrast, targeted 
criminal enforcement is probably most appropriate against key gatekeepers, such as 
the minority of traders that dominate market sales at key market and the greenhouses 
that are laundering wild orchids for international trade (Table 2d; Fig. 3).  This would 
likely be most disruptive to trade, while also limiting social impacts of enforcement.  
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Even so, many intermediaries are middle-ipncome relative to their neighbors and 
report having alternative livelihoods (Phelps 2013), such that enforcement-based 
interventions may have 'acceptable' livelihood impacts (cf. Dickson 2008).  
 
Network mapping also identifies bottlenecks on which to focus interventions.  For 
example, the disproportionate role markets play makes them appropriate and 
accessible targets (Table 2f).  Online trade via public platforms also presents key 
points for targeted enforcement.  Similarly, plants enter Thailand through a limited 
number of border-crossing where it would be easiest to disrupt trade (Phelps 2015; 
thesis).  In contrast, harvesters are generally geographically very dispersed, and some 
markets involve many redundant channels. As a result, enforcement or alternative 
livelihood projects (e.g., community greenhouses) with these groups would likely 
yield limited conservation outcomes, perhaps except in cases where species are very 
narrowly distributed (Table 2c).  
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